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CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: 
PROFIT,  POWER AND LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
H.W. ARTHURS* 
1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE CORPORATE CODES?
Industry self-regulation has a long history,1 but corporate codes of conduct have 
become a focus of political and social controversy, and of scholarly inquiry, only over the 
past two or three decades.   The ambition of this chapter is to locate these codes along 
the changing coordinates of global political economy and law.  Codes, for these 
purposes, are not a subject but an object; they are important not so much in themselves 
but for what they reveal about other phenomena.  True, codes are an object which is 
infinitely various: they operate in different industrial and commercial, social and 
political contexts, take on different institutional forms with different formal and 
informal affinities to state law, and yield variable practical and symbolic outcomes.2  
However, in order to offer a brief preliminary description of what they are (and are not) 
and what they do (and do not do) it is necessary to at least begin by treating them in 
terms of their common characteristics, rather than their differences. 
1 I have briefly reviewed this history in H. Arthurs,  "Without the Law": Administrative Justice and 
Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), and 
in  APrivate Ordering and Workers= Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct
as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation@ in J. Conaghan, K.Klare, M. Fischl (eds.)
Transformative Labour Law in an Era of Globalization Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
See also M. Baker, ATightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American
Multinational Enterprise@ (2001) 20 Wisconsin  International Law Journal 89.
2 N. Gunningham and J. Rees, AIndustrial Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective@ (1997) 19
Law & Policy 363.  
This is a draft chapter. The final version is available in Ethics Codes, Corporations 
and the Challenges of Globalization edited by Wesley Cragg, published in 2005 by 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. The material cannot be used for any other purpose 
without further permission of the publisher, and is for private use only.
 
 
 
2 
Corporate codes are, first of all, corporate.  That is to say, they are adopted  by 
corporations or collectivities of corporations, usually unilaterally and as a result of a 
decision taken in the upper reaches of management.3  True, adoption may result from 
the corporation=s  unilateral decision  to modify its conduct or alter its image, from its 
desire to demonstrate its adherence to Abest practice@ which has evolved in a particular 
business context, from its response to government or international initiatives designed 
to encourage corporate self-regulation, or by way of reaction to sanctions or rewards 
proposed by market or social actors.4  Analytically, however, it does not matter how or 
why a corporation reaches a decision that its interests would best be served by adopting 
a code; what is crucial is that neither the adoption of a code, nor its content, nor the 
modalities of its enforcement are explicitly mandated by legislation.5   It is this feature 
which distinguishes corporate codes from law per se.     Why this binary distinction - 
law/non-law - is important, and what it signifies in contemporary legal theory and state 
practise will be examined later in this chapter.  However, for present purposes it is 
sufficient to reiterate that corporate codes are by definition adopted and administered 
by corporations themselves - not by states or supra-state agencies. 
 
                                                 
3 S. Salbu, ATrue Codes versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the 
Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities@ (1994) 15 U. of Pennsylvania Journal 
of International Business Law 327. 
4 See generally B. Purchase, AThe Political Economy of Voluntary Codes@ (Ottawa: 1997, 
Voluntary Codes Project, Industry Canada). 
5 By contrast, some codes have legal effect: codes of conduct adopted by self-governing 
professional bodies exercising their statutory powers to discipline their members, codes laid down 
by government agencies or departments for the conduct by licenced practitioners of particular 
trades, and codes promulgated by private bodies such as standards organizations which are 
subsequently adopted by the state.  
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Second, corporate codes are normative.6  They prescribe behaviour by the 
directors, officers, and employees of the corporation which adopts them and often by 
closely-related entities such as  subsidiaries, suppliers, distributors or sub-contractors.  
What behaviour?  As the case studies in this volume suggest, corporate codes deal with 
business practice, the treatment of workers, relations with public officials, 
environmental impacts, human rights, or all of these.7  More specifically, they require 
that firms and individuals addressed by the code adhere to some positive standard and 
abstain from conduct which violates that standard.  Since those addressed are all in 
some way vulnerable to sanctions for violations - corporate officers may be dismissed,  
employees may be disciplined, suppliers may be denied contracts - corporate codes are 
presumably meant to be obeyed.  But in general, sanctions are neither specified ex ante 
nor applied ex post.   
 
                                                 
6 K. Getz, AInternational Codes of Conduct: An Analysis of Ethical Reasoning@ (1990) 9 Journal of 
Business Ethics 567. 
7 K. Gordon and M. Miyake, Deciphering Codes of Corporate Conduct: A Review of their Contents 
Paris: OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Working Papers on 
International Investment No. 99/2 (1999) 
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The absence of specific enforcement mechanisms and of sanctions for 
disobedience points to a third characteristic of corporate codes: though normative or 
prescriptive in form, they often appear to be merely didactic or hortatory in application.  
Many lack certain features which are conventionally found in public and private 
normative systems which are intended to shape conduct on an ongoing basis and in 
situations involving complex interactions.  For example, the language of corporate codes 
is often more vague and open-textured than legislation and too vague either to give 
useful guidance to those who wish to comply or to permit offending conduct to be 
stigmatized.   Nor is there, usually, any attempt to translate vague code language into 
operational specifics.  For example, interpretative bulletins are seldom issued; code 
administrators are seldom well-trained; high-profile incidents of compliance or violation 
are seldom used as the occasion for adumbrating secondary meanings8.  And most 
importantly, corporate codes seldom establish institutional structures or procedures 
which might generate pressure for compliance and make them more effective.9  Only a 
small number appear to fix a specific corporate officer with responsibility for 
compliance; procedures for complaints by, say, aggrieved workers are seldom laid down; 
proactive monitoring of compliance, while somewhat more common, remains sporadic 
and impressionistic; forums for the adjudication of alleged violations and the imposition 
of appropriate sanctions are infrequently provided, and when provided are even more 
rarely located at arm=s length from the corporation=s own authority structure.  To 
somewhat understate, though corporate codes may set standards of behaviour, they do 
not do so in ways which are optimally designed to ensure that such standards are 
                                                 
8 A field survey of offshore clothing manufacturers shows that only about 30% posted their codes in 
the plant, and only about 30% offered any compliance training to local management.  See U.S. 
Bureau of International Affairs The apparel industry and codes of conduct: a solution to the 
international child labor problem?   Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1996 at p. 115-116. 
9 For a recent survey of 182 corporate codes of conduct which substantiates this description see 
Report of the Working Party of the Trade Committee of the Trade Directorate, Codes of 
Corporate Conduct - An Inventory, Paris: OECD TD/TCWP(98)74, 1999.   
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adhered to.10 
 
Finally, like most normative systems, corporate codes may serve symbolic as well 
as practical functions.  For employees and contractors, adoption of a code may signal the 
corporation=s commitment to a set of values and practices.  Ideally, this signal will have 
an educative or acculturating effect; the values will be internalized; and appropriate 
behaviour will be volunteered making unnecessary recourse to complaints, 
investigations, adjudication or sanctions.  For those outside the corporation - 
governments, consumers, social movements, the media - adoption of a code may send a 
similar message: that the corporation is committed to high standards of conduct; that 
compliance will be forthcoming; and that recourse to legislation, prosecutions, boycotts, 
adverse publicity and other third-party sanctions is unnecessary.11 
 
                                                 
10 For supporting Canadian data, see R. Lindsay et al, AInstilling ethical behaviour in organizations: 
A survey of Canadian companies@ (1996) 15:4 Journal of Business Ethics 393; C. Forcese, 
Commerce with Conscience: Human Rights and Corporate Codes of Conduct, Montreal: 
ICHRDD, 1999.  A more recent survey of major Canadian companies doing business abroad 
discloses that over 85% professed to have a written document dealing with corporate ethics 
relating to labour, environmental and business practices, including about 50% which described 
such statements as Arules of conduct@ or Aguidelines@.  However, over 60% did not train their 
staff to administer such documents;  that virtually all those which did spent 4 hours per year or less 
on such training; that only 15-25% of such companies applied any aspect of their ethics codes to 
suppliers and only 2-12% reported to their Boards of Directors on compliance; and that similarly 
low rates of Board oversight were exercised even with regard to the firms= own practices.  Bribery 
stands apart as receiving somewhat more intensive and extensive scrutiny.   See  KPMG, Ethics 
Survey 2000  - Managing for Ethical Practice <http://www.kpmg.ca/enlgish/ services/docs/fas/ 
ethicsurvey2000e.pdf>  
11 F. Furger, AAssessing the Credibility of Voluntary Codes: A Theoretical Framework@ in T. 
Dietz and P. Stern, New Tools for Environmental Protection: Education, Information, 
and Voluntary Measures (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002). 
It is fair to say that much of the voluminous recent literature on corporate codes 
addresses these four key features: their provenance; their normative character; their 
structural and procedural shortcomings; and their symbolic significance.  But relatively 
little of this literature attempts to comprehend these features within larger 
developments in the fields of international political economy and the sociology of law.  
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That is the business at hand. 
 
 
2. CODES IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
Globalization, most would agree, is one of the formative developments of recent decades. 
 But there are two very different accounts of globalization, as well as variations on each.12  
 
The Amainstream@ account is distinctly optimistic.   Its emphasizes, first, a dramatic 
increase in the volume and volatility in the movement of capital, goods, services and ideas across 
national borders.  Hence a second feature: the appearance of an elaborate normative framework - 
treaties, doctrines of customary international law, contracts, interpretative conventions, national 
laws, a Alex mercatoria@ - which makes that movement orderly and provides security and 
predictability for global business transactions.13  And a third: the repeal or amendment of legal 
regimes - especially national laws - which are perceived to constrain or distort the globalization 
of markets.  And finally: all of these features are subsumed within a justificatory rhetoric which 
celebrates globalization as the source not only of general prosperity, but also of world-wide 
democratization and political liberalization.   
 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Y. Sakamoto (ed.) Global Transformations: Challenges to the State System (New York: 
United Nations University Press, 1994);  D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton Global 
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); R. 
Falk Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
13 V. Gessner and A. Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies in the Globalization of 
Law (Aldershot & Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998); R. Appelbaum, W. Felstiner, V. Gessner Rules and 
Networks - The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001).  
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Situated within this optimistic account of globalization, corporate codes can be easily 
explained.  New forms of economic activity have created the need for new normative regimes, 
not least to fill the void left by the inability of states to regulate business activity beyond their 
borders.  Responsible corporate actors - working with international institutions, national 
governments and transnational NGOs - are responding to that need, and are contributing to the 
Agood governance@ of the global economy by constructing these new regimes in the form of 
codes, resulting in the trans-national dissemination of Abest practice@ including respect for the 
environment, workers= rights and human rights, and universal adherence to the highest standards 
of business ethics and good corporate citizenship.14   No doubt there is some validity in this 
explanation for the sudden proliferation of corporate codes over the past decade.  But there is an 
alternative, more critical account of globalization which casts the whole project in quite a 
different light. 
 
                                                 
14 For an analysis of the potential advantages and shortcomings of this strategy, see B. Hepple, AA 
Race to the Top?   International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct@ (1999) 
20 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 347. 
In this alternative account, increased transnational economic activity originates in a very 
small number of advanced countries - the EU, Japan and especially the U.S.; it is dominated by a 
handful of large (and constantly consolidating) corporations within those countries; it has 
primarily benefited a small elite of corporate actors and their agents and advisors; it has brought 
some advantages to some people in both the first and third worlds; but it has also caused 
considerable damage to many economies, communities, eco-systems and cultures.  More to the 
point, while economic globalization has taken (and might yet take) many forms, in its current 
manifestation, it is closely identified with neo-liberalism.  This is to say that its proponents 
favour not simply reduced barriers to trade, but reduced levels of taxation and state expenditures 
and of regulatory interventions in general.  The corporations which are the principal agents and 
beneficiaries of globalization are also amongst the principal political supporters and advocates of 
neo-liberal public policies, especially in the United States.  And the institutions which are most 
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influential in designing, coordinating and administering the global economy - the G-7, the 
OECD, the WTO, the World Bank - are pretty much committed to the adoption of neo-liberal 
policies by their member states. 
 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that those persuaded by the more critical narrative should see 
globalization as a Aconditioning franework@ to prevent states from abandoning neo-liberalism,15 
as a strategy designed not merely to promote neo-liberalism but to Aconstitutionalize@ it and 
protect it against erosion by the periodic ebb and flow of the political tides.16   Nor is it surprising 
that they should be suspicious of institutional manifestations of globalization and regional 
economic integration, such as the World Bank, the  WTO, NAFTA and the proposed FTAA.   
 
To be sure, this critical account of globalization is no more nuanced  than the mainstream 
account.  It fails to take account of the persistence especially within the EU (albeit in attenuated 
form) of a commitment to social democratic and social market policies.  It does not record the 
reconsidered views of some leading figures in the global economy who have acknowledged that 
so far globalization has failed to deliver on many of its promises.  And of course, it does not 
acknowledge considerable variations amongst countries, corporations or communities in their 
sensitivity to issues of social justice and environmental responsibility.  But to the extent that the 
critical account of globalization is accurate, it places corporate codes in a more controversial 
perspective.  
 
                                                 
15 R. Grinspun and R. Kreklewich, AConsolidating Neoliberal Reforms: >Free Trade= as a 
Conditioning Framework@ (1994) 43 Studies in Political Economy 33. 
16 H. Arthurs, AConstitutionalizing Neo-conservatism and Regional Economic Integration: TINA x 
2" in T.J. Courchene (ed.) Room to Manoeuvre?  Globalization and Policy Convergence 
(Kingston: Mc-Gill-Queen=s University Press, 1999). 
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Instead of viewing corporate codes as having fortuitously appeared to fill a normative 
vacuum in the global economy, it is possible to argue that they have been deliberately 
promulgated by self-interested corporations (and encouraged by intervention-averse 
governments) to reinforce the neo-liberal contention that state regulation is more intrusive and 
expensive than self-regulation, if not altogether inappropriate or counter-productive.17    No less 
importantly, self-regulation - by codes and otherwise - is designed to legitimate corporate 
behaviour which might otherwise be found socially undesirable or contrary to state law.18  
Indeed, codes can be seen as part of a  larger trend to assign increased influence, prestige and 
power to global corporations while that of states declines.  Corporations, for example,  have long 
dominated the field of technical standard-setting, the necessary Ahousework of capitalism@,19 
though ultimately, these standards receive the formal imprimatur of state law.  And they have 
come to enjoy more and more scope to create the legal rules which govern their own cross-border 
business transactions, which states seem less and less inclined to supercede.20  However, 
voluntary codes take the process one step further: they allow corporations to make something 
resembling Alaw@ without state approval ex ante or ex post.21     
 
                                                 
17 For a critique see W. Scheuerman, AReflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization@ (2001) 9 
Journal of Political Philosophy 81.   
18 The whole theory of legitimation is admittedly controversial.  See e.g. A. Hyde AThe Concept of 
Legitimation in the Sociology of Law@ [1983] Wisconsin Law Journal 379. 
19 L. Salter, AThe Housework of Capitalism: Standardization in the Communications and Information 
Technology Sectors@ (1993) 23 International Journal of Political Economy 105. 
20 See e.g. The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co. 407 US 1 (1972),  Mitsubishi Motors v Soler 473 US 
1 (1985),  Morguard Investments v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077.  
21 G. Teubner (ed.) Global Law without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1997). 
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Nor is this development surprising.   Once it is accepted that many global corporations 
are richer and more powerful than states, it is a short step to acknowledge that they are almost the 
juridical equivalent of states.   This tendency reached its apotheosis in the AGlobal Compact@ 
signed by the Secretary-General of the UN with 100 of the world=s largest companies, 
asking them Ato embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of 
core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards and the environment.@   But 
while Aenactment@ has legislative connotations for those subject to their control, 
corporate signatories do not themselves incur substantive legal obligations by 
subscribing to the nine core principles set out in the Compact.  They acquire only a 
moral commitment to publically report each year at least one example of a practical 
initiative undertaken to implement these core principles.  Their reports are to be 
published on the Global Compact website, which is intended to become Aan accessible 
forum@ for the exchange of information about corporate best practices, and for a Apolicy 
dialogue@ amongst corporations, labour, NGOs and international organizations.22   In 
all these respects - self-regulation based on power, self-interest, non-binding 
commitments, vague principles, the absence of effective sanctions, and the promise of 
Agood governance@ - the Global Compact is, in essence, a voluntary meta-code.  It 
epitomizes the current search for regulatory strategies which ultimately depend on 
appeals to corporate conscience and on moral suasion and socio-economic sanctions 
organized by civil society groups, rather than on the coercive power of the much-
maligned and  now-diminished state legal-administrative system.23 
 
                                                 
22 The text is found at www.unglobalcompact.org.   For a summary of the first corporate postings see 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/un/gc/unweb.nsf/content/newsletter.htm.  I have reviewed this 
development in H. Arthurs, ACorporate Self-regulation: Political Economy,  State Regulation and 
Reflexive Labour Law@ in T. Wilthagen and R. Rogowski (eds.) Reflexive Labour Law (vol. 2)  
(forthcoming, 2003). 
23 A. Fung, D. O=Rourke & C. Sabel, ARealizing Labor Standards@ (2001) 26:21 Boston Review, 
online: http://bostonreview. mit.edu / BR26.1/fung.html; see also C. Sabel et al  ARatcheting Labor 
Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace@ (2000) 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/ sabel/papers/ratchPO.html.  
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Why would the Secretary-General - as well as states, social movements and 
labour unions -  willingly acquiesce in what amounts to self-regulation by global 
business?   The reasons are essentially pragmatic.  Codes - the Global Compact included 
- are typically promulgated in the wake of egregious episodes of corporate misconduct 
which mobilize public indignation.  As the Global Compact itself notes: 
 
...[R]ising concerns about the effects of globalization on the developing world ... 
suggest that, in its 
present form, 
globalization is not 
sustainable. The 
Global Compact was 
created to help 
organizations 
redefine their 
strategies and 
courses of action so 
that all people can 
share the benefits of 
globalization, not 
just a fortunate 
few.24  
 
                                                 
24 Text of UN Global Compact, supra note 22. 
This is a praiseworthy objective, no doubt, but it is much less ambitious than attempting 
to readjust the balance of power between the corporations which dominate the world 
economy and the states, communities and peoples who are adversely affected by their 
>strategies and courses of action@.   
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Individual states face similar problems when confronting these corporations.  If 
they do not respond at all to allegations that corporations are abusing workers, 
consumers, the environment or human rights, they risk alienating public opinion and  
having to deal with disruptive boycotts organized by NGOs or labour unions.   But if they 
respond too vigorously, they risk alienating foreign investors and having to defend 
themselves before a trade tribunal.25    States - like the UN - therefore tend to opt for 
symbolic rather than effective responses.  Specifically, they are often willing to 
pronounce themselves in favour of better corporate behaviour, and to accept assurances 
of such behaviour in the form of voluntary codes.    As in the case of the UN, what is 
most important to the political authorities - and the offending corporation - is to be able 
to say that the problem has been Aaddressed,@ and that safeguards have been put in 
place to Aensure@ against repetition.     
 
                                                 
25 D. Schneiderman, ANAFTA=s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada@ 
(1996) 46 University of Toronto Law Journal 499. 
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Social movements also have reasons for acquiescing in the very imperfect 
outcomes likely to be achieved by voluntary codes.26   They have limited mandates, are 
always short of resources and their greatest weapon - aroused public opinion - is 
inevitably a wasting asset.  They too will therefore often welcome the chance to Asolve@ 
a particular problem, to Awin@ a particular struggle, by securing the adoption of a code.  
And finally, while labour unions do not suffer from the same institutional debilities as 
social movements, they are hard pressed to confront transnational corporate activities 
which adversely affect their members or workers abroad.  They wield less bargaining 
strength, political influence and legislative protection than they once did; sympathetic or 
secondary action in solidarity with offshore unions is likely to be held illegal both at 
home and abroad; and the intended beneficiaries of such solidarity - third world workers 
- may suspect (rightly) that transnational labour standards will operate as a form of 
protectionism, which keeps first-world jobs at home and denies first-world market 
access to goods from low-wage economies.  Thus, corporate codes may be the best that 
unions can hope for as well, but they testify to the current weakness of organized labour: 
they are adopted and administered unilaterally by the employer - arguably under 
pressure, but with no significant democratic participation by workers either through the 
electoral process or through collective bargaining.27  
 
                                                 
26 R. O=Brien, ANGOs, Global Civil Society and Global Economic Regulation@ and R. Mayne, 
ARegulating TNCs: The Role of Voluntary and Governmental Approaches@ in S. Picciotto and R. 
Mayne, Regulating International Business - Beyond Liberalization (New York: St. Martin=s 
Press, 1999). 
27 A. Blackett, AGlobal Goverance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law 
Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct@(2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
401  
 
 
 
14 
However, experience with corporate codes has been disappointing for all 
concerned.  Because of their structural and institutional limitations, canvassed above, 
codes seldom do actually Aaddress@ or Asolve@ problems - at least in their early 
iterations.  As this has become better understood, all parties have modified their code 
strategies accordingly.  Corporations have taken to developing codes in anticipation of 
crises rather than in reaction to them.  They have attempted to enhance their efficacy by 
better drafting, by assigning clear responsibility for compliance, by engaging monitors 
and, in a few instances, by committing themselves to some form of third-party 
adjudication.  Governments have begun to encourage the adoption of codes by providing 
technical advice and assistance, and in some cases, by providing incentives for effective 
code regimes.28  Indeed, legislation has been proposed - unsuccessfully - in several 
jurisdictions which would require corporations to adopt codes under threat of losing 
their access to export loan guarantees and other government benefits.29  Social 
                                                 
28 The Canadian government has been particularly active in this regard.  It has commissioned a series 
of research studies which were presented to a major stakeholders= conference on >Exploring 
Voluntary Codes in the Marketplace= (Sept.  1996) issued an extensive report  - Standards 
Systems: A Guide for Canadian Regulators (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1998) -  and worked with 
stakeholders to develop a users= guide - Voluntary Codes: A Guide to their Development and Use 
(Ottawa: Industry Canada/Treasury Board, 1998).  It has also maintained an ongoing Voluntary 
Codes Project with an activist Director [Kernaghan Webb, webb.kernaghan@ic.gc.ca] and a 
website [htttp://www/strategis.ic.gc.ca/volcodes].  Finally, it has helped or is helping to promote 
the use of voluntary codes, especially by Canadian-based firms doing business abroad.   See e.g. 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative funded by Human Resources Development Canada in 
cooperation with the Conference Board of Canada, described in G.  Khoury, J.  Rostami, P.  
Turnbull, Corporate Social Responsibility: Turning Words into Action (Ottawa: Conference Board 
of Canada, 1999); International Code of Ethics for Canadian Businesses, described in R. 
Culpepper and G.  Whiteman, AThe Corporate Stake in Social Responsibility@ in M.  Hibler and 
R.  Beamish (eds.)  Canadian Corporations and Social Responsibility (Ottawa: The North-South 
Institute, 1998). 
29 In the United States, see the Corporate Code of Conduct Act, HR 4596 IH (Rep.  McKinney) 
introduced June 7, 2000.   Complying corporations would receive preferential treatment in the 
awarding of federal contracts, participation in trade and development programs and access to 
export-import credits and loan guarantees. The proposal did not pass.   In Australia, a similar 
Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 was introduced by Senator Vicki Bourne as a private 
member=s bill. it received First and Second Reading and was referred on 5 October 2000 to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities for inquiry and report by 31 March 
2001 (subsequently extended to 28 June 2001).  The Committee held public hearings and issued a 
report in June 2001 recommending against adoption on the grounds that the Bill was  
Aunnecessary and unworkable@. See http://search.aph.gov.au/search/ parlinfo.ASP?action= 
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movements have bid, sometimes successfully, for a role in the initial drafting and 
ongoing administration of codes.30  And a veritable industry of code consultants, 
monitors, auditors and experts has grown up to ensure that successive generations of 
codes do not suffer from the same defects as the first.31   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
browse&Path=legislation/.  
30 See H. Arthurs,APrivate Ordering and Workers= Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes 
of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation@ in J. Conaghan, K.Klare, M. Fischl (eds.) 
Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001)  
31 By way of example, one of the Abig five@ accounting/consulting firms advertises that it will 
Adevelop corporate codes of conduct ...@ ,  Aensure the integrity of regulatory controls,@ and 
investigate Afor regulatory compliance@  See Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/ca/eng/ about/svcs/dai_lp.html. See also  Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu 
http://www.deloite-sustainable.com/services/CSR.htm. and KPMG http://www.itcilo.it/english/ 
actrav/telearn/global/ ilo/code/ageof.htm.  However,  auditing by  these firms, which provide other 
services for their clients as well, has been criticized, see e.g. D. O'Rourke, AMonitoring the 
Monitors:  A Critique of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Labor Monitoring@ (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000) For examples of independent monitoring 
agencies see: Social Accountability International [SA 8000] http://www.cepaa.org, Bureau 
Veritas Quality International [BVQI]   www.bvqi.com and Interek Testing Services [ITS] 
www.itsqs.com.  The Fair Labor Association [FLA]  - an advocacy group - maintains a list of FLA 
Accredited Monitors, see http://www.fairlabor.org/html/monitors/ accredited-monitors.html.  The 
Ethical Trading Initiative [ETI] - a tripartite organization of companies, NGOs and trade unions 
likewise supports a Monitoring and Verification Working Group.  See http://www.ethicaltrade.org.  
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In short, some codes now have what they previously lacked: relative 
sophistication, plausible prospects of compliance and a community of stakeholders 
including both corporations and their critics.  What they do not yet have is a 
documented record of success: there is little or no evidence that codes actually change 
corporate behaviour.32 
 
Depending on which account one accepts of the provenance and significance of 
codes, the absence of evidence that codes accomplish anything is either without 
significance or precisely what might be expected.  Those who accept the conventional 
account will be inclined to say that it is too soon to judge the efficacy of the most recent 
generation of codes, that efficacy in any event is difficult to measure since codes are only 
one amongst many variables determining corporate behaviour, and that even state law 
has been shown to yield unpredictable or perverse outcomes.  Those who proceed from a 
more critical perspective on globalization will point to the fact that codes are written and 
administered by corporations which - they believe -  have no interest in protecting, say, 
the environment or the rights of women.  If they did, these same corporations would 
have supported stronger state laws instead of advocating their repeal or conniving in 
their avoidance.  
 
3. CORPORATE  CODES AS AN EXAMPLE OF ALAW WITHOUT THE 
STATE@ 
 
                                                 
32 The most rigorous empirical study to date suggests that in fact, codes tempt corporations to engage 
in bad behaviour because code subscribers are less likely to attract regulatory scrutiny. A. King 
and M. Lenox, AIndustry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry=s 
Responsible Care Program@ (2000) 43 Academy of Management Journal 698.  
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What, then, is the relationship of corporate codes to law?   As I have tried to 
show, corporate codes may be used to deflect state law, to create the illusion of law while 
fending off the reality of regulation.  But that is not the whole story.    Obviously, to the 
extent that law is understood  in professional discourses and everyday speech as the 
distinctive normative system of  the state,33 corporate codes cannot be law in the strict 
sense; but they may certainly become symbiotically entangled with state law, whether by 
accident or design .   The juridical and political implications of this entanglement will be 
briefly considered.    Second, codes provide a valuable optic within which to reflect on 
the fate of law in an era of globalization, and on some more general issues of socio-legal 
theory.   
 
(a) The potential symbiosis of corporate codes and state law 
 
I have suggested throughout this chapter that corporate codes - for good or ill - 
have filled the normative vacuum created as globalization and neo-liberalism have 
combined to diminish the force of state law in the field of social and economic 
regulation.   I now want to consider the opposite possibility:  that corporate codes may 
be used in coordination with state law, to resuscitate it, and to focus it more accurately 
and with greater effect on particular domains of social and economic activity. 
 
On the one hand, codes may theoretically be used  to pour meaning and content 
into state (or, for that matter, international)  law even though they are not designed for 
that purpose.   For example, whether a corporate practice falls below a standard of 
Areasonable@ care, thus attracting liability in tort, might be benchmarked by reference 
                                                 
33 See e.g. Black=s Law Dictionary (6th ed.): ALaw is a solemn expression of the supreme power of  
the State ... a body of principles, standards, and rules promulgated by government@; Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) online: <http:// 
dictionary.oed.com>  Alaw: I. A rule of conduct imposed by authority. ...    1. a. The body of rules, 
whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community 
recognizes as binding on its members or subjects....  2. a. One of the individual rules which 
constitute the >law= (sense 1) of a state or polity....@ 
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to a voluntary corporate or sectoral code; codes adopted by agreement of the members 
of trade associations, or amongst companies and NGOs, might be enforced as contracts 
between the signatories, unless there is evidence that no such enforceability was 
intended; and code provisions, though not meant to be binding, might nonetheless be 
read in as Aimplied@ terms of a corporation=s contracts with workers who accept 
employment or consumers who purchase goods in reliance on them.  Might: but so far, 
litigation has been relatively rare, empirical studies rarer still, and the possibilities of 
creative interaction between state law and voluntary codes remain largely a matter of 
speculation.34 
                                                 
34 For an excellent review of potential symbiotic relationships between state law and voluntary codes 
and a review of relevant common law jurisprudence see K. Webb and A. Morrison,  AThe Law and 
Voluntary Codes: Exploring the >Tangled Web=@ in K. Webb (ed.) Voluntary Codes, Private 
Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Ottawa: Carleton University Research Unit for 
Innovation, Science and the Environment, 2002) at 112 ff.   
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States and their courts have, from time to time, viewed voluntary codes as an 
illicit attempt to suppress competition or brushed them aside as  an imperfect substitute 
for regulation.35 However, quite often, states have deliberately chosen to authorize the 
adoption of  corporate codes, given them legal effect or enforced them through the 
imposition of sanctions. For example, professional bodies such as Law Societies exercise 
delegated statutory powers to adopt codes and to discipline their members for non-
compliance; 36  Canadian product safety legislation has long incorporated by reference 
standards established by the Avoluntary@ codes of the International Standards 
Organization (ISO), and the Canadian Standards Association (CSA);37  legislators in at 
least two countries have proposed that firms doing business abroad should be required 
to adopt and adhere to Avoluntary@ codes in order to qualify for state-provided 
advantages such as export loan guarantees or sourcing contracts;38 and one innovative 
U.S. court has required a group of abusive employers, with offshore production facilities 
in a dependent territory,  to adopt a  code of workers= rights, and  to submit to court-
supervised monitoring of compliance.39   
 
                                                 
35 Webb and Morrison, supra note 34, at 142 ff. 
36 See e.g. Law Society Act R.S.O 1990 c. L8 s. 10 which provides that Convocation may make by-
laws, Aauthorizing and providing for the preparation, publication and distribution of a code of 
professional conduct and ethics.@ 
37 The Standards Council of Canada was established in 1970 by the Standards Council of Canada 
Act, now RSC 1985 C. S-16.  It mandates the SCC to Aestablish or recommend criteria ... relating 
to the preparation, approval, acceptance and designation of voluntary standards@, to accredit non-
governmental Astandards development organizations@ and to approve standards submitted by 
those organizations as Anational standards@ (s. 4(2)(c)-(e)).  These voluntary standards then 
receive the imprimatur of regulatory authorities and acquire the force of law.  See e.g. B.C. Reg. 
234/96 (bicycle safety helmets), O. Reg. 82/95 (efficiency of electrical appliances). 
38 Supra note 29.  
39 For a history of the litigation, see Sweatshop Watch, Summary of the Saipan Sweatshop Litigation, 
http://igc.org/swatch/marianas/summary10_00.html. 
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So indeed, as a technical matter, codes might be grafted onto state law, and made 
enforceable as if they were contracts or statutes, and could conceivably become the 
regulatory norms of the global economy.  This would be a transnational instance of  the 
widespread privatization and hybridization of  legal functions which is occurring within 
the domestic domain of  the neo-liberal Acontracting state@ - the shrinking state, the 
state which Acontracts out@ its responsibilities and powers.40    Such a development is 
actively advocated by some scholars, including the editor of this volume.41    
 
                                                 
40 See e.g. J. Freeman, AThe Contracting State@, (2000) 28 Florida State University Law Review 
155; M. Priest, AThe Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation@ (1997-98) 29 
Ottawa Law Review 233; H..Arthurs and R. Kreklewich ALaw, Legal Institutions, and the Legal 
Profession in the New Economy@ (1996)  34 Osgoode Hall L. J.  
41 W. Cragg this volume. 
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However, it is unlikely. If corporate codes were to become more closely entangled 
with state law, they would inevitably lose their distinctive Acorporate@ or voluntary 
character.    This is likely to make them less attractive  to key actors.   After all, 
corporations initially adopted these voluntary codes precisely because they preferred 
self-regulation to state regulation.  Why would they now willingly re-engage with state 
law?  And why would states willingly return to more conventional forms of regulation, 
based on state law?   After all, they originally acquiesced in or actively promoted the use 
of corporate self-regulation in the global economy, either enthusiastically as part of a 
neo-liberal project, or reluctantly out of fear that more conventional forms of state 
regulation would bring down the wrath of investors.  Unless they have now abandoned 
neo liberalism or revised their estimate of the likely market reaction to state regulation 
why would they revive the old state regulatory apparatus, in either its original 
configuration or - in what would be perceived as a functional equivalent - in the form of 
a new hybrid of state-authorized, monitored and enforced no-longer-quite-corporate 
codes?    And finally, states initially accepted corporate codes as a substitute for 
legislative regulation because to some extent they felt they had  to:  because they 
believed that corporate conduct abroad  lay beyond their jurisdictional reach, or because 
they lacked practical means to assert their regulatory powers.   But at least the first of 
those constraints was always less definitive than it was made to appear.   Under 
international law, states have the right to legislate and regulate extraterritorially,  at 
least with respect to their own citizens, corporations which they charter, or activities 
which have a material domestic impact, though conducted abroad.42    True, practical 
problems of enforcement would remain: how to deploy inspectors to scattered sites 
around the world; how to gather reliable evidence from employees or informed 
observers on site; how to avoid conflicts with local legal and political authorities, how to 
                                                 
42 See e.g.  K. Messen, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice (Boston: Kluwer, 1996), 
 J. Zimmeman, Extraterritorial Employment Standards of the United States: The Regulation of the 
Overseas Workplace (New York, Quorum Books, 1992). 
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avoid cultural bias in the application of the code.43  But these problems would also 
confront states if they tried to conscientiously monitor compliance with corporate codes, 
rather than attempt to enforce  their own labour or environmental laws.44  
 
In other words, a shift from purely voluntary codes to those mandated by law and 
monitored by the state, from pure self-regulation back to a system in which the state is 
seriously implicated in the regulatory process, represents the crossing of a Rubicon.   
And if so, why would states settle for half-measures?  If they are being asked to place 
their imprimatur on corporate codes, whose contents and administration they do not 
directly control, but for whose shortcomings and misadventures they may be blamed, 
why would states not enact and enforce their own standards through law?     If hybrid 
state-corporate regimes pose political, economic, juridical and practical risks 
comparable to those of regulatory legislation plain and simple, why would states not 
simply enact laws with extraterritorial reach?    State norms, state administration and 
state sanctions, they might justifiably feel, are at least more democratic, and arguably 
more effective, than corporate codes. 
 
                                                 
43 See  S.  Prakash Sethi, ACorporate Accountability Through International Codes of 
Conduct -- Theoretical Implications and Challenges to Cross Cultural Applications: The 
Case of Mattel, Inc.@ (Sao Paulo: International Society of Business, Economics, and Ethics 
(ISBEE), Second World Congress, 2000). 
44 See K. Stone, ALabor in the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor 
Regulation@ (1995) 16 University of Michigan Journal of International Law 987.  
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 If this analysis is sound, if the Aevolution@ of codes foreseen and advocated by 
enthusiasts45 does lead to the re-integration of  corporate regulation with the state 
system, this might signal the beginning of the long march back from neo-liberalism to 
some version of our former social-democratic or social-market states.  At the least, it 
would present us with a new map of regulation, shifting the focus from a borderless 
global economy ruled by codes and other manifestations of Asoft law@46 to the once-
familiar contours of nation states striving to define and protect  the public interest 
through laws which are applied vigorously and with effect.    
 
(b) The significance of corporate codes for socio-legal theory 
 
                                                 
45 I include our distinguished editor in this category.  See  W. Cragg, this volume.  
46 See e.g. C. Chinkin, AThe Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law@ 
(1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850; S. Sciarra, ASocial Values and the 
Multiple Sources of European Social Law A (1995) 1 European Law Journal 1; A. Boyle, ASome 
Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law@ (1999) 48 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 901; K. Stone, ATo the Yukon and Beyond@ (1999) 31 Journal of 
Small and Emerging Business Law 93; H. Hillgenberg, AA Fresh Look at Soft Law@ (1999) 10 
European Journal of International Law  499.  
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The possible symbiosis of corporate codes and state law is of interest not only 
from the perspective of political economy, but from the perspective of socio-legal theory. 
 For two hundred years, Alaw@ has been understood by lawyers as the Awill of the 
sovereign@,47 in modern parlance as the expression of state policy promulgated and 
administered by state institutions.  Indeed, traditional legal theory adopts a binary 
approach: things are either law or they are not; depending on the presence or absence of 
a state nexus.  The Arule of law@ - a fundament of our constitution - requires that 
everyone be subject to the same law, and that law be authoritatively pronounced by state 
courts.48  The promulgation of norms originating elsewhere - within public 
bureaucracies or corporations, for example - is said to violate the rule of law.49  Customs 
and contracts likewise have no legal force except to the extent that they are found to 
conform to the requirements of state law.50   And as my fellow contributor, Prof. Cragg, 
insists, even corporations - the authors of the codes we are discussing - are  
 
....legal artefacts ... [which] could not exist without the active agreement and 
intervention of governments.... [and which] are created and operate in that legal 
space51 
 
This affinity of law and state, and the binary approach it necessitates, has of 
                                                 
47 J. Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995; originally published 1832).   In fact, Austin acknowledged the existence of Alaws by a close 
analogy@ - including Alaws of honour@ - as well as Alaws by remote analogy@, but these differed 
from Alaws properly so called@.  See Lecture V at pp. 106-163. 
48 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution   (London: Macmillan, 8th ed., 
1915) at 110. 
49 See G. Frug, AThe Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law: (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 
1276. 
50 M. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws ( Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979) at 4; S. Waddams, The Law of Contracts (Toronto: Canada Law Book . 4th 
ed. 1999) at pp. 399-403. 
51 W. Cragg, this volume.  
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course given rise to many difficulties.  What of pre-modern societies which developed 
something that looked a great deal like Alaw@ but no state structures we would recognize 
as such?   What of state law in modern societies which becomes archaic and falls into 
disuse?  What of patterned behaviours which develop within the interstices of state 
institutions such as police forces or welfare agencies, unsanctioned by state law and 
sometimes subversive of it?  What of the complex normative systems generated within 
non-state Asocial fields@ - ethnic and religious communities, workplaces, universities, 
family relationships, business networks - which are so powerful that they can deflect, 
reinforce, transform, capture or even cancel state law?  And, of course, what of corporate 
codes?     
These problems associated with an insistence on the state nexus of law, and on 
law=s binary character, have given rise to a number of competing theories of law, which 
question both elements of the conventional position.  These theories coalesce around the 
idea that state law is just one amongst many legal systems, that law is immanent in all 
social relations, and that the various normative regimes described above - including 
corporate codes - should be regarded as law no less than the particular set of rules 
promulgated and enforced by the state itself, so long as they exhibit similar 
characteristics or perform similar social functions.  True, adherents of this view have 
sectarian tendencies. They include legal pluralists and polycentrists,52 followers of 
Bourdieu53 and Teubner,54 devotees of Asoft law@55 and postmodern chroniclers of 
                                                 
52 S. Moore ALaw  and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an Appropriate Subject of 
Study@ (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719; J. Griffiths, AWhat is Legal Pluralism?@(1986) 24 
Journal of Legal Pluralism 1; S. Merry ALegal Pluralism@ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869; 
H. Peterson and H. Zahle (eds.) Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995). 
53 P. Bourdieu AThe Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field@ (1987) 38 Hastings 
Law Journal 808.  
54 G. Teubner (ed.) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin/New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1988); G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992); 
J. Priban and D. Nelken (eds.), Law=s New Boundaries: The consequences of legal Autopoiesis 
(Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001).   
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Agovernance@.56 True also, this more open-ended view of  law has neither altered the 
conventions of daily speech, nor won over many lawyers and judges.  It has not  even 
attracted unanimous support in socio-legal circles.57   Nonetheless, for purposes of the 
present analysis, it is important to understand that corporate codes constitute one 
amongst many examples of a widely-noted phenomenon in the socio-legal literature: 
Alaw without the state@.58 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
55 Supra note 46. 
56 See e.g. P. Millar and N. Rose, AGoverning Economic Life@ (1990) 19 Economy and Society 1;  J. 
Matlary, ANew Forms of Governance in Europe?  The Decline of the State as a Source of Political 
Legitimation@ (1995) 30 Cooperation and Conflict 99; B. Jessop, ACapitalism and Its Future: 
Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance@ (1997) 4 Review of International Political 
Economy 561; G. Stokes, AGovernance as Theory: Five Propositions@  (1998) 155 International 
Social Science Journal 17; C. Hewitt de Alcantara AUses and Abuses of the Concept of 
Governance@ (1998) 155 International Social Science Journal 105.  
57 B. Tamanaha, AThe Folly of the Social Scientific Concept of  Legal Pluralism@ (1993) 20 Journal 
of Law and Society 192. 
58 See A. Blackett, AGlobal Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law 
Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct@ (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 401; 
H. Arthurs, ALabour Law Without the State?@ (1996) 46 U. Toronto L.J. 1;  Teubner, Global Law 
without a State, supra note 21.  
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If  Alaw without the state@ - a quintessentially postmodern concept59  - is an idea 
whose time has come in contemporary socio-legal theory, it is an idea whose time has 
also come in the new political economy wrought by globalization and neo-liberalism.    
Globalization, after all, stresses that state sovereignty, policy and law must be 
subordinated to the requirements of international trade and investment; neo-liberalism 
seeks to reduce state power and activity in almost all respects, including the production, 
interpretation and administration of law.60    Indeed, legal scholars have stressed the 
transformative effects of neo-liberal globalization on how we think about public policy 
and translate it into law,61 if not on our very notion of what law is and does.62  
 
Whether it is mere coincidence that the de-centering of the state in legal discourse 
should occur simultaneously in socio-legal theory and in political economy, or whether 
the two are causally related, is a question for another occasion.  However, everyone with 
an interest in the relationship of law to social ordering, must be interested in the 
phenomenon of corporate codes which are, after all, a striking example of Alaw without 
the state@ involving the most powerful actors in the global economy, in some of their 
most ethically significant and politically sensitive relationships.  
 
                                                 
59 B. Santos, ALaw: A Map of Misreading.  Towards a Postmodern Conception of Law@ (1987) 14 
Journal of Law and Society 279 at 297. 
60 H. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich ALaw, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New 
Economy@ (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1.   
61 H. Arthurs, AGlobalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal Fields@ 
(1998) 12:2 Canadian Journal of  Law and Society 219; M. Zürn ASovereignty and Law in a 
Denationalised World@ in R. Appelbaum, W. Felstiner, V. Gessner supra note 13. 
62 See e.g. W. Twining, Globalisaton and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000); D. 
Dyzenhaus (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford: Hart, 1999); W. 
Scheuerman, AGlobal Law in our High Speed Economy@ in R. Appelbaum, W. Felstiner, V. 
Gessner (eds) supra note 13; V. Gessner and A. Budak (eds.) supra note 13; B. Santos, Toward a 
New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (New York: 
Routledge, 1995). 
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CONCLUSION: IF CORPORATE CODES ARE THE ANSWER, WHAT IS THE 
QUESTION? 
 
To this point, I have suggested that corporate codes serve the somewhat divergent 
purposes of various public and private actors in the global economy, that they may be 
mutating into new forms as their shortcomings become more obvious to those actors 
from their respective points of view, and that they can be seen as one amongst many 
examples of non-state legal orders which have come into focus during a period of neo-
liberalism, globalization and post-modern socio-legal theorizing.   What I have not said - 
because the evidence does not sustain the claim - is that codes are either demonstrably 
effective or democratically legitimate.   In other words, if Ahow best to prevent anti-
social corporate conduct in a global economy?@ is the question, corporate codes are not 
the answer.  Or, more accurately, they are not the answer except under certain 
conditions, when they may be a part of the answer.  What are those conditions?     
 
As numerous authors suggest,63 codes work best when their corporate authors are under 
pressure to adopt them and live by them, which is to say when they are less Avoluntary@ 
rather than more so.   For reasons canvassed above, pressure from unions and social 
movements in the form of sympathetic strikes, boycotts or political pressure may 
succeed in the short term, but is subject to many shortcomings.   Pressure from the state, 
in the form of threatened or actual legislation and active oversight of corporate 
behaviour, is likely to be more successful.  Moreover, state regulation mandating 
corporate codes, having emerged from a democratic political process, may be more 
credible and successful in legitimating self-regulation.  But again there are problems.  
State regulation is in something of a crisis.  State regulatory agencies have been 
                                                 
63 See e.g. P. Fridd and J. Sainsbury, AThe Role of Voluntary Codes of Conduct and Regulation - A 
Retailer=s View in S. Picciotto and R. Mayne (eds.) Regulating International Business - Beyond 
Liberalization (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999); K. Gordon, ARules for the Global Economy: 
Synergies between Voluntary and Binding Approaches@ Working Paper on International 
Investment No. 1999/3 (Paris: OECD, 1999) N. Gunningham and J. Rees, supra note 2; B. Hepple 
supra note 14; W. Cragg, this volume.  
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enervated by the attacks of neo-liberals and anti-state populists; their reach is 
circumscribed by globalization; their authority has been undermined by over-reaching 
reviewing judges; even in good times, they have difficulty in mustering adequate 
resources; they are notoriously prone to Acapture@ by those they are meant to regulate; 
and they are seldom able to cope with stonewall corporate resistance.  Thus, there is a 
case to be made for state strategies which deploy positive and/or negative incentives to 
persuade or coerce corporations to police themselves, whether through codes or 
otherwise.64  Such strategies may well reduce political resistance, economize on scarce 
resources, reduce corporate evasion, avoid the problem of extraterritoriality, turn the 
Acapture@ phenomenon on its head and shift the emphasis in regulatory relationships 
from hostility to cooperation.65   But none of this is likely to happen if state action is not 
a clear and present alternative to self-regulation.  In effect, then, the success of codes 
depends on them being less voluntary rather than more so. But paradoxically the less 
voluntary they are, the less likely they are to attract corporate endorsement and elicit 
corporate cooperation, and thus the less likely they are to secure all the hoped-for 
benefits.    
 
Second, the institutional design and implement of codes is widely held to be an 
important determinant of their success.  The more explicitly a code addresses the 
particularities of specific activities, sectors or enterprises, the more likely it is that its 
requirements will be met, or at least the more likely it is that violations will be identified 
and sanctioned.   The more explicitly a code fixes responsibility for compliance upon 
designated corporate officers, and provides incentives and training for those with line 
responsibility for compliance, the more likely it is that they will do what they are 
supposed to do.    The more explicitly a code provides channels for complaints, 
                                                 
64 G. B. Doern AInstitutional and Public Administrative Aspects of Voluntary Codes@ in K. Webb 
(ed.), supra note 34; J. Rees Reforming the Workplace - A Study of Self-Regulation in 
Occupational Safety (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988).  
65 See e.g. K. Gordon, supra note 63.  
 
 
 
30 
protection for whistle-blowers, procedures for monitoring, and sanctions for violation, 
the more likely it is that violations will come to light and be dealt with appropriately.   
And the more explicitly a code provides for transparency, for second and third party 
participation, for arm=s-length evaluation and adjudication, the more likely it is that it 
will gain the respect, trust and participation of those who are its intended beneficiaries.   
 
All that is pretty clear from the literature.    But equally clear is the fact that most codes 
fall short of the ideal, often far short.  This brings us to a third question: if there is a high 
degree of consensus about when codes work best - when they are linked to state 
regulation, carefully designed and aggressively and transparently administered - why has 
that consensus not produced a more rapid advance towards optimal approaches to code 
design, and to more effective protection for the ultimate beneficiaries of codes - workers, 
environments, consumers, human rights, vulnerable communities and a general public 
served by governments and businesses operating with integrity?  
 
The mystery is not hard to solve.   In part, the answer is power: its shift from states to 
markets, within markets to a shrinking number of larger and larger corporations, 
amongst such corporations to those located in a very small group of countries,  within 
those corporations from local management closest to the social consequences of 
corporate activity to head offices closest to the economic outcomes, and within head 
offices from those involved with products and people to those involved with earnings 
and share prices.  In part, too, the answer is a fundamentalist belief: that Athe business 
of business is business@, that profits will ultimately trickle-down and benefit everyone in 
the global economy, that corporate commitment to a social agenda is misconceived and 
likely to dilute profits, and that state attempts to influence corporate behaviour - even 
indirectly - are likely to adversely affect both corporate and social welfare.   In short, 
corporate codes in general have not evolved in the ways we believe they should because 
this would involve a retrenchment, however modest, of corporate power and the revision 
of the deeply held belief system of those who wield that power.  
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Is there no way forward?  Of course there is.  Many ways: the way of the corporate social 
responsibility movement, which hopes to change dominant belief systems within global 
corporations and to modify corporate behaviour, if only to save global capitalism from 
itself; 
the way of social democratic and social market economies, which seek to re-balance the 
power equation as between state and market and to achieve a better mix of economic 
efficiency and social justice; the way of protest movements, which aspire to shift power 
from the global to the local, from corporations to communities, from the enhancement 
of profits to the protection of the environment, culture and human rights. But only when 
we begin to locate corporate codes of conduct within this large, complex and volatile 
debate about neo liberalism, globalization and the nature of Alaw@ can we hope to 
understand their true significance and potential contribution.    
 
 
 
                                                 
*. University Professor of Law and Political Science, York University, Toronto.  My thanks to the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, and to Asha Kaushal and 
Freya Kodar  for their research assistance.  
